Rail
Safety
May
1, 2007
Brothers and Sisters,
The following are the findings, released last year from the Transportation
Safety Board's investigation of the December 4th, 2002 derailment
of 42 tank cars loaded with molten sulphur at Mile 11.8 of the
Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) Taber Subdivision in Alberta.
The full report can be found on this Website.
I believe that it is self explanatory and still relevant today.
Stay safe, stay strong, stay united,
Bill Brehl
Safety
Issues Investigation Report SII R05-01
3.0 Findings
1. The statistical analysis demonstrates that annual bulk tonnage
traffic is strongly correlated with the rail defect rate at a
statistically significant level, while overall tonnage is not.
2. Where rail weight is less than 130 pounds, increased bulk unit
train tonnage significantly increases rail defects, resulting
in a higher risk of broken rail derailments.
3. Although railways recognize the accelerated rate of track degradation
associated with bulk unit train tonnage on secondary main lines,
the occurrence record indicates that an appropriate balance between
increased track degradation and timely infrastructure maintenance
and/or renewal has not been achieved.
4. Although railways are responsible for putting measures in place
to keep the track safe and in compliance with the Railway Track
Safety Rules (TSR), the TSR may be insufficient to ensure safety
because they do not consider the adverse effects of overall increased
traffic and specifically bulk unit train tonnage on secondary
or feeder track systems over the long term.
5. Inadequately inspected and maintained rail joints represent
a critical point of vulnerability since they are prone to defect
development and failure. Inspections of rail joints using current
rail defect detection equipment or geometry cars are unable to
identify joint bar defects.
6. There is a continuing risk of fatigue cracking around rail
bolt holes because chamfering of field drilled holes is not carried
out.
7. While rail defect testing reduces the risk of broken rail derailments,
the detection of all internal rail defects is not within the capacity
of the defect testing methods currently in use.
This
report concludes the Transportation Safety Board's investigation
into this occurrence. Consequently, the Board authorized the release
of this report on 25 May 2006.